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'' lf planning is a necessity and an advantage to the community, as is 
undoubtedly the case, a means must be found for removing the confl let between 
private and public interest~" 
-Expert Committee on Compensation and [3etterment, Final Report (1942, p.23) 
Introduction 
-------· 
The common law has always recognized private restrictions on the use of 
land. The law of nuisance may prevent a man from using his land In such a way as 
to interfere with a neighbour's enjoyment of his own property. Land may be held 
subject to a restrictive convenant which for too benefit of adjoining property 
restricts its use, perhaps to that for a single family dwel I ing. Besides these 
"private" constraints, the use of land today is subject to an assortment of 
statutes, regulations, and by laws. There is a fundamental difference, however, 
between private and pub I ic restrictions. 
Anyone who purchases land must be taken to be aware of the bundle of rights 
that he is obtaining. The buyer of a parcel located in the middle of a stable 
residential neighbourhood knows that he cannot build a smelter, even if there are 
no zoning by laws or environmental standards, because of the danger of a nuisance 
action. The price he pays wi I I reflect this restriction upon use. Similarly, a 
parcel subject to a restrictive covenant wi I I be discounted in value to reflect 
the value of the right which is not the vendor's to sel I. 
When a restriction on the use of land is imposed in the public interest by a 
statute of by-law there is no constitutional guarantee in Canada that the owner 
be compensated. Despite the judicial presumption that property rights may not 
be confiscated by the state unless the legislative intention to do so is expressed 
clearly, 1 the restrictions on the right to develop land do not give rise to compen-
satlon.2 Therefore, the owner is left to bear the loss. This is the Important differ-
ence between private and pub I ic restrictions: in the latter the appropriate financial 
increase the value of land while the owner merely waits. Perhaps at least a 
portion of this unearned Increment or "betterment" should be returned to the 
community which created it, rather than be retained by the owner at the expense of 
I 
his neighbours. The recent United Nations Conference on Habitat resolved that 
participating countries take appropriate measures to reclaim such additions to 
land values. 5 
It may be argued that to oppose speculation in land is an ideological position 
which has nothing to do with planning as such. However not only do financial 
considerations p~ay a major role in planning decisions, as we have argued above, 
but also the planning process is an aid to speculation Itself. Obviously use 
restrictions diminish the supply of developable land, and so make those properties 
upon which more Intensive development is permitted more valuable. At the same 
time opportunities are enhanced for the sophisticated, those with easier access to the 
planning process, those with an "ear" at city hal I. 
The fundamental problem of the affect of planning on land values and the 
consequent undesirable affect on planning Itself was recognized in the early town 
planning legislation. The British statute of 1909 which empowered local authorities 
to adopt town planning schemes also prov.ided for full compensation for those whose 
property was thereby diminished in value and allowed the local authority to claim 
50% of any increases (cal led betterment). This provision was considered by Its 
framers essential to the Implementation of the schemes. Canadian legislation 
model led on thi~ statute contained similar sections on compensation and betterment. 
As we shal I see below, these provisions proved unworkable, both here and in England. 
The English have made further attempts at resolving the confl let between the private and 
pub I ic interest in the use of land. We in Canada have been unconcerned with the 
problem, perhaps because untl I recently there has not been any firm resolve to enforce 
proper planning, as opposed to zoning to protect property values. In areas under 
development pressure, zoning has generally fol low~d the market. However, the 
Local counci I Iars cannot be expected to make sound decisions with respect to 
development when they are subJected to the pressures of developers who stand to 
make huge financial gains or homeowners solely concerned with the protection of 
property values. What is needed Is a mechanism whereby such pressures are mlnlmized. 4 
Because these factors have always operated, land uses have not been rationally 
allocated In spite of the fact that local authorities have had ample powers. 
Even if restrictions on land use were imposed and removed purely on the 
basis of the larger public Interest, surely it is unfair that some must pay whl le 
others reap a windfal I -often simply because a line is drawn a certaln way on a 
map. If the community wishes to use someone's land for a public work, then the 
community pays. But when the use of land Is restricted to agriculture by a zoning 
by-law while the market cal Is for development, the owner bears the loss. The lucky 
owner in the same area who is permitted to bul ld may make a huge gain while his 
neighbourhors make nothing. These results can put planning in a bad I ight. 
Considerations of "fairness" and "unfairness" to particular owners affect decisions, 
particularly these made st the local level. Thus one encroaching use if often the 
thin edge of the wedge. 
The financial consequences of restrictions on land use constitute an assault 
on the restrictions themselves. Land use planning has largely been ineffectual 
in the face of market forces because we have not addressed the problem of who pays 
for its implementation. Advocates for compensation have not been vocal, simply because 
planning has been so accommodating to the market. 
Apart from the problem of fairness between landowners is that of fairness 
vis-a-vis the community at large. Permitting profitable development allows the 
owner to cash In an asset which has appreciated in value because of community 
action and not because of any contribution made by the owner. The municipality 
may have provl ded the Infrastructure (roads, services, etc.) Government or 
Industry may have made significant investment decisions which create jobs in a 
locality. Then the community permits intensive development. These factors greatly 
financial problem must now be faced squarely if we are to be successful in 
Implementing comprehensive land use planninq. 
This paper discusses historical attempts to adjust the financial consequences 
of public decisions concerning land use. We shal I begin by examining the first 
English provisions, their interesting 1947 experiment, and subsequent developments 
in that country. We shal I look at the use of development agreements and dedication 
requirements, and also at land banking, tools which are fami I far in Canada. Finally 
we shall recognize the grO\ving interest in the United States in the problem of 
compensation and betterment by describing an innovative American response, the 
transfer of development rights. 
l~_l_r]_g_IJ sh ~f?_r_l_enc~ 
The English have been grappling with the problem of the real location of 
land values by restrictions on use since as early as 1909. Although they have 
attempted severa I types of sol uti,ons and the matter has become bound up in the 
divergent policies of successive Labour and Conservative administrations, it wi I I 
be instructive to outline chronologically the English approach. 
In the introduction we have already mentioned the first legislation dealing 
with land use planninq per se, the Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act of 1909, The 
statute empowered local authorities to prepare and adopt town planning schemes dealing 
with the use of land I ikely to be developed -essentially suburban land. Such schemes 
could divide an area into zones and prescribe permitted uses for each, and set 
standards for the space about bui !dings, the height of bui !dings, and even their 
11 character 11 (perhaps allowing regulation of design or appearance). The Act addressed 
the financial problem by providing for claims for compensation and betterment. An 
owner whose land was 11 injuriously affected" by the making of a planninq scheme or the 
execution of public works under the scheme could, within a specified time period 
make a claim on the local authority for the amount of his loss. The claim could 
not be made where the restrictions imposed concerned such things as yard requirements or 
was akin to a public health requlation. But the confiscatory nature of severe 
restrictions on land use was recognized. On the other hand, where the value of land 
was enhanced by the making of a scheme or the execution of public works under It, 
the local authority within the specified time could make a claim on the owner for 
one-half of such increase. 
The difficulties with such an approach are obvious. The major one Is the 
necessity to establish a causal connection between the makfng of a scheme and 
changes in land use for a claim to be successful. Other factors are not to count, 
such as demographic chanqes or major investment decisions which create or diminish 
I 
demand for intensive use of !arid in~ locality. With respect to betterment, the 
local authority had to make its claim within the specified time against an owner 
who had not actually realized any gain and perhaps was not interested in disposing 
of his holding. Needless to say any such claim would be bitterly opposed and would 
not enhance the political popularity of the councl I Iars. In fact mechanisms for 
claiming betterment caused by the pub I ic works met with I ittle success 1n London 
in the 19th century. 
Therefore, the system did not work as planned. The Barlow Commission reported in 
1940 that the process of planntng was being hindered throughout the country because 
of the inadequacy of the financial provisions. Local authorities were hesitant to 
restrict land uses because of the I iabi lity for compensation (in practice it was 
much easier to show that a loss of value was ca~sed by a planning scheme). In theory~ 
compensation was to be paid out of betterment but betterment was irrecoverable in 
practice. The 1932 Act had Increased the portion of the enhanced value that could 
be claimed to three-quarters> but this adjustment had not made the claim any easier 
to enforce. The same Act had empowered local authorities to adopt planning schemes over 
any land (not just suburban), but by the early forties only 5% of the country was 
subject to schemes. The Barlow Commission recommended that a committee of experts be 
constituted to examine the questions of compensation and betterment. 
The result was the Uthwatt Committee, whose report published In 1942 Is an 
important statement on the financial problem. The Committee found that a compensation 
provision such as the one In the 1909 Act is inherently inflationary because of the 
way the market In land operates. In an area where development Is expected 
the values of an individual parcel of land wl I I rise because of the ,chanc~ that 
valuable development wl I I take place on that site. However, the most remunerative 
development wl I I be permitted on only one of a few sites. Development potential can 
be represented by a "floating value" which will notal iqht on most of the potential 
sItes, ev0n thougli the 1 r va hJe has increased because of the chance that it w 1 I I . 
The aggreoated cl alms of all the affected owners wi II be greater than the real loss 
occasioned by the scheme. Whether or not the doctrine or "floating value" accords 
with orthodox economic theory is beside the point. Awards made by tribunals and 
courts of compensation to be paid by expropriating bodies probably do support the 
thes 1 s. 
The Uthwatt Committee be II eved that betterment cou I d never be made to ba I ance 
compensation where the land Is held be a mutipllclty of owners. They recommended that 
development values be secured for the community by prohibiting private development 
(with once and for alI compensation) and by having the state acquire land to be made 
aval lable for development. 
The Town and Country Planning Act 1947 dre\v substantially on the work of the 
Uthwatt Committee. In effect the right to develop land was nationalized. No 
development could take place without permission. If permission were refused no 
compensation was payable. If permission v1ere granted the owner had to pay a 
development charge to a Central LandBoard. This charge represented the difference 
between the market value of the land after the permission and its existing use value. 
Thus the entire portion of value which represented development potential was paid 
to the state. Local authorities and other publ lc bodies could acquire land at its 
existing use value. To compensate owners once and for alI for loss of the right to 
develop, a boo mi Ilion fund was extabl ished to which owners could make claims. 
Compensation was payable for loss of development values which existed In 1947, but any 
such values created after that date belonged to the state. 
The logic of the system was quite attractive. Since a person wishing to develop 
land was aware that he would have to pay Its development value to the state, he would 
offer only existing use value to the seller. Presumably the original owner would be 
happy with his claim to the fund. But if he refused to sel I at existing use value, 
the purchaser could apply to the Central Land Board which would expropriate the 
property for him. 
However, in practice land continued to change hands at prices exceeding existing 
use value. Owners expected to receive some portion of development value, or they 
would not sell at all. The Central Land Board almost never used its power of 
expropriation. The result was that the land owner was retaining at least part of the 
betterment and the developer's I iabi lity to pay the development charge was In effect 
a tax, over and above betterment, which increased development costs. 
There Is much argument as to the causes of this state of affairs. Supporters 
of the development charge allege that owners deliberately kept their land off the 
market in the expectation that a Conservative administration would soon be elected 
which vwu I d abo II sh the system. Perhaps the theory and purpose of the mechanIsm were 
not adequately explained so that the market was unable to make the proper 
calculations. On the other hand, detractors say that the IOO% charge removed alI 
Incentive to bring land forward for development. England was sti II subject to a post-
, wa'r shortage of labour and materials, however. It may be that development was 
proceeding as quickly as physically possible. 
In any case, Labour lost the next election and the financial provisions of 
the Act were abo! ished In 1953. However, the Act's provisions for the implementation 
of land use planning were not changed, and have remained substantially the same to 
the present day. Another principle was left intact: denial of planning permission 
was not to ~ive rise to compensation for loss of development value created after 
1947. 
Thus from 1953 a developer no longer had to pay the charge. The government's 
I lab! lity to pay claims a~ainst the JJOO ml I lion fund was also abolished. An owner 
who had e.stablished a claim under the old provisions would nov1 receive it only If he 
applied for planning permission and were refused, or If his land were expropriated. 6 
During this period of experimentation with ways of appropriating unearned 
increments in land values for the community there was no capital gains tax In 
England, as in Canada. In 1962 a "short-term gains" tax was implemented. This was 
a tax on speculation: gains on assets held for a short period of time. Three years 
later a ful 1-scale capital gains tax was promulgated. Although such a tax is clearly 
a method of recapturing unearned increments, it did not satisfy the Labour Party, as it 
desired to treat the land question as a special case. 
Rapid increases In the price of land and pub I lefty concerning huge speculative 
gains became issues during the next election campaign. The resulting Labour Government 
enacted the ~and yommission Act 1967. This Act created the Land Commission which was 
eventually to have wide powers of land acquisition. It would make land aval I able 
for development. Thus the Uthwatt recommendation that development land pass through 
pub I ic ownership was to be implemented. Under this statute a 40% betterment levy was 
imposed. This levy was payable when development gains were realized - upon sale, lease, 
or physical development. It was envisaged that the levy would rise gradually, 
though never to 100% - a concession to the Incentive argument. 
This new system was shortllved, however,. The Conservatives, returning to power, 
abol !shed it in 1970. Because of generous transition provisions and the fact that 
the Land Commission never did receive Its wider powers of acqusitlon, it is difficult 
to gauge the Act's chances of success. 
Obviously the land question Is a highly political one In England. The position 
of Labour is that "positive" planning and recapture of gains in land values is only 
possible through public ownership. The Conservatives of course uphold private 
ownership and initiative. Yet even they regard development gains as a special 
case. In a 1973 White Paper they proposed a development gains tax, which would 
treat as ordinary income for tax purposes the increase in value realized when 
development takes place. The Labour government implemented this proposal in 1974 as 
an interim measure. 
In 1975 the 9ommunity Lan~~t was passed. If and when it Is completely 
Implemented, this statute will require local authorities to aquire all land I ikely 
to be developed within the next succeeding ten years. No development wi I I be 
permitted except on land owned by local authorities or made avai !able by them for 
the purpose. Ultimately the price that they wi I I pay for such land wi I I be 
existing use value. During the transitional staqe local authorities have the Q_~ 
to acquire development land rather than the duty. They pay a reduced price: 
net of "development land tax", a levy collected upon disposal or actual development. 
This tax is now at 80% of development value7 and Is to be increased gradually. 
The Conservatives have promi·sed to rereal the Community Land Act. 
The Canadian Experience 
In the early part of thrs century the western provinces experimented with the 
taxation of land or site values. Site value taxation consists of a property tax using 
as a base only the value of the land Itself, exclusive of the value of bul !dings or 
other improvements. Thus Increases in land values are taxed proportionately and a 
part of the unearned Increment is returned to the community. In theory a tax on land 
cannot be shifted to its occupants. Rather It is reflected in lower prices. 
Site valuation had by 1914 been adopted in two-thirds of British Columbia's 
municipal !ties. In 1912 it was made mandatory In Alberta. By 1914 Sasaktchewan's 
municipalities were either using site values or taxing improvements at a lower 
percentage. ~~anitoba never went completely to this basis, but even today improvements 
are one-third exempt. 
It appears that site value taxation was used in Western Canada not primarily 
because of Its effect of recapturing unearned increments, but because ot its 
other alleged salutary effects. This is, it was felt that It would encourage 
the breaking up of large tracts of vacant land held by absentee owners, and would 
discourage speculation. Apparently Is succeeded In the former objective, but the 
period of Its use conlncided with the most spectacular boom in land prices ever 
expe~ienced in Western Canada. Sepculatlve profits were so great that even huge 
Increases in property taxes were a minor consideration. 
When boom went to bust and land values fel I, the tax base was eroded. Five 
of the six B.C. municipalities which defaulted in their debts in the thirties had 
been using site value taxation untl I the early part of the decade. The instabi I tty of 
land values as a tax base was the factor which ended the Western Canadian experiment. 
Of course, site value taxation Is administered soundly In AustralIa and New 
Zealand, and land prices are not today subject to violent fluctuations. But It 
cannot be advanced as a desirable method of recapturing unearned increments. This 
is because of Its accompanying undesirable effects. The property tax carries a much 
heavier load in Canada then in AustralIa and New Zealand. Not to tax Improvements 
would mean that services were being delivered without relation to the amount of tax 
received. Other sourcer of revenue would be required. Exaggerated claims are made 
for site value taxation with respect to encouragement of redevelopment of downtown cores 
and slums. An examination of cities "down under" shows that change in the basis for 
property taxation is no panacea. It is fairly certain that one effect would be to shift 
part of the tax burden from suburban residential property to the city's commercial core. 
This fact explains why land value taxation has been chosen as a local option In 
New Zealand. But suburban residential land use is already heavily subsidized, and 
the site value basis would contribute to the destruction of Inner city communlties. 8 
As mentioned above, the 1909 English legislation was used as a model by 
several Canadian jurisdictions, and the provisions concerning 8laims for 
compensation and betterment were faithfully cop,Jed. There is no evidence of these 
provisions ever having been invoked. The last to disappear was ~~anitoba 1 s. That 
province's new Planning Act of 1975 sti II contained a section allowing a 
municipality to claim one-half of any increase in land values caused by the enactment 
of a zoning by-law or the execution of works under a development plan. This section 
was left unproclalmed and was repealed this year, apparently because It was believed 
to be unworkable In practice. 
Some idea of the practical problems encountered In trying to make a claim for 
betterment upon an owner of land may be gained from the experience under'Newfoundland's 
Housing Act and Its predecessor, the Slum Clearance Act. That statute allows 
recovery of betterment from owners benefitted by a public housing project. One 
attempt was made In the early fifties and a great deal of public controversy ensued. 
Collections were very difficult to enforce. The authorities apparently decided that 
recovery of such a claim was not worth the administrative difficulty9 and nows its 
practice Is to acquire more land than is actually needed. There is reason to believe 
that a claim for betterment under the early Canaidan planning legi.slation would have 
been even more difficult to enforce. Besides having to deal with the resentment of 
owners, a municipality would have the difficult task of showing that a parcel of land 
had increased in value because of restrictions on the use of other land. 
There Is some experience in Canada with an unearned increment tax 10 . Such a 
measure is easier to enforce because it is not collected unti I a gain is realized. 
The Alberta !Jn~arn_§_g _ _l_llcrement_Tax Act was in force from 1913 until 1956. It levied 
a tax on increases in land values that accrued between transfers, at first 5% and from 
1938, 10%. The value of improvements or development was deducted from the increase. 
It was repealed as part of a general lowering of taxes. 
In 1974 Ontario enacted the _LanQ._§_peculation Tax Act. The purposes of this Act 
were said to be to curb speculation and to recapture windfal I profits. Of course it 
it ended speculation then no revenue would be collected. At Its original level 
~ 
of 50% It apparently did have a prof~nd affect on real estate transaction, because 
the federal government disallowed the tax as an income tax deduction and thus the 
combined effect could come to over 100% of a gain. Subsequently the speculation 
tax was reduced to 20%. Ontario's tax Is not primarily an unearned increment tax 
because It Is aimed at speculation per se. In seeking to exempt those who are not 
considered speculators, a great deal of unearned increment is retained by owners. 
This fact Is most significant for our purposes when we note that a holder of land 
wi I I not be liable to tax if he bul Ids before selling, and the first sale of 
serviced land wl I I not attract tax I Jab! I ity. Thus many gains in development value 
are free of speculation tax. A true unearned increment tax would allow the deduction 
of the value of development undertaken, rather than an al 1-or~nothing exemption. 
Capital gains tax is itself a form of tax on unearned increments, the major 
differences being that the rate of tax is related to income and capital losses may 
be deductible from gains. As noted before, the clamour for recapture of development 
gains In England took place in the absence of a capital gains tax. At present the 
Labour legislation seeks to replace the private market In development land. It can 
be argued that unless we in Canada desire to replace the market, then capital gains 
taxation should suffice in recouping a portion of development gains for the 
community. The major shortcoming of this approach is that the community that creates 
the gain does not benefit directly from the revenues collected. There, fhe Alberta 
11 Land Use Forum recommends that the federal government be asked to permit the 
province to collect capital gains taxes on land. The province would then distribute 
the funds to the municipal !ties. 
There is one kind of unearned Increment which Is successtul ly prevented in 
Canada. When a new subdivision is approved municipalities are able to allocate 
a great deal of the costs It generates to the development itself. Through the use 
of development agreements, the appl !cant may be required to donate land for parks. 
and highways, to construct sewers, street I lghts, and other faci llties, or to pay 
cash imposts or lot levies. Lately there has been criticism that some municipal !ties 
are asking for too much and thus driving up the cost of housinq. But there is no 
evidence that the developer could not command as high a price if, for example, 
servicing standards were lower~d! 2 It is0certain that removing the obi iqation to 
pay a 5 or 10% fee in I leu of park dedication would not cause a corresponding decrease 
in prices. What these requirements for development permission do is to prevent the 
owner from reaping a windfal I by allocating costs to his development. Abuse does 
exist when a subdivider is required to pay for capital Improvements not necessitated 
wholly by the impact of his particular development. It should be pointed out that 
municipal !ties use such techniques not to prevent windfal Is but to pass the burden 
of financing services and park acquisition to new developments. 
Land banking has been advocated as an effective method of recapturing 
development gains for the community. Publ lc ownership of development land seems 
to have worked successfully in such cities as Saskatoon and Red Deer, where funds 
recaptured have made the schemes self-sustaining and paid for infrastructure. One 
claim often made for land banking is that It lowers housing prices by eliminating 
windfal I profits. However, if such land is disposed of to builders or homeowners 
at cost then no increment is recaptured by the community. Unless restrictions are 
placed on further disposal, the occupants will reap the windfall. Thus the 
objective of lowering prices must be achieved artificially, by subsidizing new 
occupants and preventing them from disposing of their property at market value. It 
Is thus necessary to recognize that recapturing unearned increment and providing 
housing at reduced prices cannot both be achieved magically by land banking. Some 
lowering effect on market value is produced only where a large proportion of the 
local market for bui I ding lots Is provided by the publ lc land assembly. 
The cost of land banking Is a crucial Issue. To work properly the pub I lc 
must pay for the land a price largely exclusive of development value. If not, the 
cost may be prohibitive and the objective of recapturing development values wf I I 
not be met. The English government intends eventually to allow acquisition at 
current use value- at present a pol !tical impossibility in this country. Therefore, 
public authorities in Canada must put together their land assemblies far in advance 
of contemplated use, before development values become too large. The successful 
land banking programs in western Canada began with widescale tax forfeits during 
the depression. The cities concerned were spared the problem of initial cost. 
Pub I ic land assembly for development purposes is cheaper prior to the 
announcement of a project of the adoption of a development plan. Once owners in 
a locality are aware that an assembly is to be made, even if no development is 
'· 
contemplated within the next ten years, prices wi I I tend to rise. This wi II become 
a greater problem as long-term development planning becomes more widespread. 
Con~iderations of pub I ic participation and consultation with those affected wi I I 
inflate the cost of land assmebly for the pub I ic agencies and authorities. I 
The Avai !able Techniques - Evaluation 
In the introduction the financial problem was explained. Mitigating the 
confl let between the public and the private Interest was seen to be a necessity.lf we 
are to be successful in implementing restrictions on use of land. At the same time 
some portion of the unearned increment in land values must be returned to the 
community which created it. 
As we have seen, the Enql ish approach is to remove the confl let by ending the 
free market in development land. This is to be accomplished by giving local 
authorities the power of acquiring such land at its existing use value and 
prohibiting development on private land. Clearly such a policy, even it it were 
objectively desirable, would be a pol !tical impossibi I ity in this country. Public 
ownership of land is a feasible technique in Canada within the market system, but 
it is useful in recapturing development gains only if the land is acquired before 
the gains occur. Therefore, It is not available where the land concerned is already 
adjustments are not made. As we shal I see, the fact that they are not presents 
considerable difficulties for the effedlve implementation of restrictions felt to 
be in the pub I ic interest. 
Significant power to control development has been delegated by the provinces. 
to the level of the local counci I. Typically the tool used has been zoning, 
whereby the area Is divided into zones and permitted uses prescribed for each. The 
zoning power Is often guided by a development plan, which is a statement of the 
community's pol icles for prospective land use. An alternative method for the 
Implementation of planning is development control, which requires permission for 
development on a case-by-case discretionary basis. There Is also a hybrid form 
of control, conditional zoning, where some uses r:!l~ be permitted in a zone. A 
province may have granted a local authority the power to prevent an owner from 
demo! ishing a bui I ding, where it Is felt to be of historical or architectural interest. 
AI I of these tools seek to prevent an owner from developing his land to Its 
most remunerative level In the name of the pub I lc Interest. Invariably the owner 
bears the cost. At the same time, an owner who is permitted to develop his land 
intensively wi I I not only realize his normal expectations but wl I I reap a windfal I 
because of the artificial restriction on the supply of land for comparable development. 
Thus the implementation of non-universal land use restrictions real locates land 
values. 
The pol icy Is that the publ lc interest Is paramount and the costs and 
benefits should fall where they may. This policy assumes that decisions concerning 
development are made in a "public interest" vacuum. The reality Is otherwise. 
Often in a rezoning decision the broad publ lc Interest fades into the background 
whl lea fight takes place between different interests motivated by financial 
conslderations. 3 Thus the prospect of gain'or loss may be an important factor in 
decisions concerning development, while the rationale of planning itself is the 
bel lef that such a consideration does not produce the optimal pattern of land use. 
undergoing pressure for development. Unfortunately, the most crucial problems of 
land use occur In such areas. 
If the market is to continue to operate then the recapture of wlndfal I gains 
Is primarily a matter of taxation. A key feature of a tax system would be the 
return of the proceeds to the relevant municipality. Perh~ps the system already 
In place that taxes unearned increments, the Income tax, could be adjusted to 
operate in this way. 
Taxing unearned Increments addresses only one part of the financial problem. 
What can be done to effectively Implement restrictions on use over land which 
already has attached to it significant development value? There must be some 
measure of compensation for the affected owner. Those who benefit from the removal 
of competitive land from the development market could be asked to provide this 
compensation. Such an approach is being suggested In the United States. It involves 
the concept of ·the trans fer of deve I opment rights. 
JransferaE_L~velopment Rights 
Ownership of land can be described as possession of a bundle of rights 
over a particular piece of property. The right to carry out some operation or 
improvement on the land, that is, to development property, is normally one of 
the rights of ownership. This right may be disposed of by the owner or taken 
away by the state, but the right always pertains to that specific parcel. The 
concept of transferable development rights (or TOR) involves making such a right 
transferable to other properties on which restrictions on development exist. 
Enabling legislation would be required. 
TOR would operate as follows. Let us say that It is in the pub I lc Interest 
that a particular area be kept in agricultural production, while the market 
considers th~ land ripe for residential development, at a density of so many 
dwel I ing units per acre. When the land Is ~oned for agricultural use, owners of 
land are issued TORs based on such a density. Although they are prevented from 
developing their own land, they maysel I the TORs to owners in another zone 
where higher density development is appropriate. In the "transfer zone"Jowners 
need TORs In order to increase the permitted density of their use. 
TOR may be appl led in any situation where it is necessary to preserve 
the existing use of land in the pub I ic interest. Thus It has appl !cation in the 
preservation of farm land, the protection of environmental resources, the 
maintenance of buffer zones, or the preservation of buildings for architectural or 
historical reasons or to maintain lower-cost housing. A TOR system could be used 
to implement comprehensive planning over a large area with many owners. Agricultural 
land and open space, commercial, industrial, and residential sites, and pub I ic 
facl I ities could be designated for specific locations in the planning area. Those 
who are left with land zoned agricultural have excess development rights. A 
l:and6wner whose land is designated as industrial must buy TORs in order to be able to 
build a factory. The municipal tty need not bow to pressure to rezone since those 
who own valuable property are compensated for the restriction on use by being able to 
se,f I their TORs. Windfal Is are reduced by the amount paid for the TORs. 
Thus TOR enables restrictions on land use to be imposed without creating 
wlndfal Is for some and losses for others. By doing so it mitigates the pressures 
that serve to destroy wei 1-lald plans. And although the burden is I ifted from the 
owner of preserved property, the cost is not borne by the pub I ic purse. 
TOR was first proposed as a method of saving "landmark" but !dings in the 
Chicago Loop area. Owners of such but !dings would be issued TORs w~ich represent 
the difference between square footage allowed by the present zoning and the square 
footage of the protected building. TORs could be sold within the Loop area, enabling 
buyers to build their sites to greater heights. The city would be qlven the power 
to acquire TORs and perhaps would be issued TORs with respect to public buildings. 
The Chicago Plan, as it is cal led, has not been implemented. 
The City of New York has had same experience with transfer of "air rights" as a 
preservation tool. 
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The an~w~r of a protected bui I ding can trasnfer his air 
rights to other properties. However, the scheme is a voluntary one. Recently 
an attempt by the City to impose preservation of privately-owned parks In 
13 this way was inval !dated by the New York Court of Appeals. The court held 
that zoning the land to "public park" was an unconstitutional deprivation of property 
rights without due process of law. The transferable development rights that the 
owner was given did not amount to proper conpensatlon because their value depended 
on an uncertain market and future approvals of administrative agencies. But the 
court noted that such an objection could not be made to the Chicago Plan, because 
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that scheme provided for sure compensation In that an answer could sel I his rights 
to the city. 
Several local authorities in the United States have provided for the use 
of TDR without the benefft of specific enabling legislation. Townships in New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania have enacted zoning ordinances which allow TDR to be 
used to preserve agricultural land. The zoning by-law of the town of Sunderland in 
Massachusetts seeks to preserve farmland along the Connecticut River by using TDR. The 
plan for Westwood WI I lage In Los Angeles provides for TDR to preserve its character./ 
The towns of Southampton, N.Y. adopted an ordinance using TDR to encourage housing 
for low and moderate income people. Col ller County in Florida has appl led TDR to 
f ' t I It' 't 14 areas o env1ronmen a sens lVI y. 
Last year a Transferable Development Rights Bl I I was submitted to the New 
Jersey legislature. It just failed passage and has been reintroduced. This 
legislation would allow a municipal lty to Implement TDR for the preservation Of 
land of historic, environmental, and economic significance. Property-ovmers in 
the preservation zone would be issued TORs on the basis of their property's 
proportion of the total assessed value of property In the zone. The municipality 
could set up a TDR bank which would acquire and dispose of TORs. TORs would be 
taxed as real property. Enabl lng legislation has also reached the bl I I stage In 
New York, Oregon, Colorado, and Connecticut. 
The key to the success of a TOR scheme I ies in the marketabi I ity of the 
development rights. There must be a demand for higher densities in the transfer 
zone and owners in that zone must not be permitted to build to those higher 
densities unless they own the requisite TORs. If they are already permitted by 
zoning to build to the highest density that the market can accommodate, then the 
TORs wil I have no exchange value. This means that the level of development without 
TORs that is to be permitted in the transfer zone must be finely set. At the same 
time planning considerations must not be discarded inside the transfer district. 
Obviously, to apply TOR successfully wi I I require a thorough analysis of conditions 
in the area affected. 
Probably TORs would be taxed as real property. The treatment would vary 
depending on the basis for taxation in each and the various exemptions employed. 
It should be possible to implement TOR with I ittle net effect on the tax base. 
Other implications of TOR would require some thought before Its implementation. 
A scheme could be thwarted If developers were able to divert their activity to 
a nearby area which v1as outside the scheme. Perhaps planning on a district or 
regional basis would be necessary. A method of recording ownership of TORs would 
be needed. vJould TOR Increase the cost of housing any more than would the preservation 
of existing uses Itself? What would be the effect on mortgages? 
One area where TOR appears to be particularly appropriate Is that of 
building preservation. The present technique of saving a bui I ding of historic or 
architectural interest is to perform a holding action unti I some scheme is devised that 
the owner can accept or the funds are gathered to acquire it. Ib~ OIJJario tl_~Lta~__l.ct 
is a good example. TOR would allow the city to prohibit demolition or alteration while 
the owner would be compensated by sel I ing the rlqht to build more office space to 
owners in the downtown business district. In effect there would be a form of bonus 
zoning. Rui lders of office developments would be paying the cost of bui I ding 
preservation in return for being permitted to increase density. The owner of a 
protected bui I ding would have his property tax reduced if he sold his TORs. 
Sti I I, owning such a building can be a burden and the TOR scheme should be a 
complement to other preservation techniques. The cost of repairs and maintenance 
that it would be burdensome to impose on the owner could be provided by the sale 
of TORs allocated to public bui I dings or donated to the city. 
The effective implementation of a TOR system depends on how market forces 
operate. At the same time adjustments wi I I have to be made in other areas such 
as the property tax. In order to study how such a scheme would best operate in 
practice and how the necessary adjustments could be made, It would pe instructive 
to devise a model based on an actual locality which is undergoing development 
pressures on an actual sites in a downtown area. Such a demonstration would 
examine how TOR could be used to implement perceived planning objectives, what 
the economic effects of TOR would be, pnd whether the market in TORs would function 
as it is meant to do. 
Conclusion 
The financial problem of land use planning is most critical in areas where 
land values are being pushed up by development pressures. Public acquisition of 
such land is not an available method of appropriating the unearned increment. It 
is only useful if such land is already in the public domain. An unearned increment 
tax could return a portion of land value increases to the community. From a practical 
point of view, the best way of imp·lementing such a tax is to return the present income 
and capital gains tax, where they have been generated by transactions in land, to 
the municipalities. The problem of compensation for those whose 1and Is severely 
restricted ~n use may be amenable to solution by a system of transferable development 
rights. The next step is to demonstrate the feasibi I ity of a TOR scheme. 
FOOTNOTES 
~~~-----
1. See Colonial Su~Co. v. Melbour~~ (1927) A.C. 343. Some provincial planning 
statutes make clear the intention that compensation is not payable for 
restrictions on use. See, for example, Alberta's EJ.9..!l.IJ..Lf1Jl __ Act, R.S.A. 1970, 
c. 276, s. 135. 
2. See Re: Bridgman and Toronto (1951) D.R. 489 at 496, and Coleman v. McCallum 
a~g Toronto (1913), I I D.L.R. 138 at 142. 
3. The courts have recognized this fact of I lfe in judicial izlng the rejoining 
process. A te IIi ng examp I e is Howatson V. Ass in I bo i ne Park __ C_omf!J_UIJ_L.t'L_ 
_Q.ommittee, 37 DLR (3d) 584, (1973) 4 WI~R 449, where a by-law was quashed because 
the committee made its' recommendations cifter having consulted with its staff, 
rather than at the meeting where the confl feting interests were heard. 
4. Of course another factor mi I ltatlng against proper planning is the desire for 
higher assessment. The solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5. The resolution reads: "The unearned increment resulting from the rise in land 
values resluting from change of use in land, from public investment or decision 
or due to the general growth of the community must be subject to appropriate 
recapture by appropriate public bodies (the community), unless the situation 
cal Is for other measures such as new patterns of ownership, the general acquisition 
of land by public bodies or other similar measures. 
6. Public authorities thus could acquire land at a bargain price, since they only 
had to pay current use v~tue plus the amount of the 1947 claim, whl le development 
value could have risen greatly since then. It was not untl I 1959 that ful I 
market value became the basis of compensation for expropriation: There are 
probably some properties In England which sti I I carry an establ !shed 1947 claim 
(at 1947 prices plus one-seventh! 
7. Loosely speaking. Actually the "base value" can be as high as the price paid 
for the land plus IO%. 
8. For an excellent critique of site value taxation, see Clark, 11Site Valuation as 
a Base for Local Taxation", Report of the 1961 Conference, Canadian Tax 
Foundation, p.75. 
9. London's experience In the 19th century was similar. 
10. The Eng I ish had an unearned Increment tax from 1909 unti 1 1920. 
I I. A body appointed by the provincial government to Inquire into land use problems. 
12. Another consideration is that low Initial servicing standards may mean high 
maintenance costs. 
13. Fred F. French Investing Company, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 160, May 4, 1976. 
In Canada, of course, no objection could be made to a TOR scheme on constitutional 
grounds. 
~2-
14. Consult Helb, Chavoushlan, 8 Nieswand, Development Rights Bib I iography 
(Rutgers U., 1976). 
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TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
PRESERVATION ZONE 
TRANSFER 
ZONE 
Goals: To preserve agricultural use on the tovm fringe, to prevent 
sprawl. 
In the preservation zone: Land is zoned agricultural. 
In the transfer zone: Land is zoned residential at a certain density. 
Calculation is made of the capacity of the transfer zone to carry 
higher densities. The total number of TDRs created will equal the 
estimated final density that will be accommodated. 
These TDRs are allocated to ovmers of land in the preservation zone. 
One TDR certificate ~vould represent the right to, for example, one 
additional dwelling unit per acre. 
An o'mer of land in the transfer zone may have his site rezoned to a 
higher density if he buys the requisite TDRs. 
2 
PRESERVED BUILDINGS 
Goal: Building preservation. 
Designated buildings may not be demolished or altered. Their owners 
are issued TDRs representing the right to so many square feet of 
corunercial space. 
o-wners in the surrounding business district may have their sites 
rezoned to a higher density if they buy the requisite TDRs. 
RIVER RAIL HAY 
PARK INDUSTRIAL 
BUFFER 
HIGH\iTAY SHOPPING 
SCHOOL 
Goal: Comprehensive planning - over developed land. 
Uses are allocated in the development plan as shmvn above. TDRs 
(residential, comn1ercial and industrial) are allocated to all owners 
in the area. For an mvner to develop he must own the appropriate site 
as shmvn on the plan plus the requisite number and type of TDRs. 
These 'vould have to be purchased from other owners. 
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